A common starting point for ethics[i] is to consider what morality demands.  But an alternative approach is to consider more generally what we should do.  Should we start narrowly with morality, or broadly with practical reason?   I think we should make practical reason our starting point and so treat ethics as covering all decision-making about how to act.[ii]

This approach is supported by the obvious fact that much important practical reason lies outside morality.  Personal choices are not thought of as moral, but they matter greatly.   Government and corporate decisions are vital, but they again are not seen as part of morality.  Even when others are involved, much of our thinking is not about morals, but more about practicalities.  And big emerging questions such as on the future of humanity seem to be beyond the scope of traditional moral thinking. I believe the boundaries of ethics should be set to include all these matters.

Further, ‘morality’ is a problematic concept and so cannot be a solid foundation for ethics.  Morality is not clearly defined. It can variously be about respecting social norms, considering others, acting by principle, fulfilling duties, or about following natural law or divine command.  The concept of morality has no clear boundaries and is continuous with other practical thinking.  Morality has varied enormously around the world and over time.  For example, western morality is unusually narrowly focused on welfare and fairness rather than wider values such as authority and sacredness[iii], and is transitioning to have less of a religious or natural law conception. And so far as morality is still thought of as being about natural law or religion, then its nature is mysterious, and from a naturalistic perspective it may be fundamentally mistaken.[iv] 

By contrast, the broad conception of practical reason provides a robust and uncontroversial starting point.   Choosing how to act is a basic and unavoidable human function – if we chose badly, we can suffer or die, if we chose well, we may be able to flourish.  Choices are made by a variety of agents – from individuals to governments – relative to different constraints and time horizon.  Choices can concern actions, but also related matters such as rules and institutions.  Practical reason ranges from the trivial – whether to have a coffee – to the very consequential – a government deciding to go to war.  Within this broad domain of practical reason, morality, however defined, is a limited part. We have to navigate the world, and morality at most is only an element in this navigation.  Practical reason asks the universal question ‘what is the better choice,’ while morality only helps provides an answer in limited circumstances.

Another advantage of starting from a broad conception of practical reason is that the ethical landscape becomes clearer.  We can see that practical reasoning is ubiquitous with choices about what to do being made at many levels. We can see that while some decisions are easy, others are difficult or have no clear answer.  We can see that we sometimes do not do what we think we should.  We can see that decisions are made largely from evolved instinct with a limited role for reasoning.[v]  We can see that much practical thinking has an end-relational character, where ends that matter are chosen and means are assessed.[vi]  We can see that action by an individual is constrained by social norms, obligations and limitations on authority.  The philosophically minded can see that particular decisions are often inconsistent, motivating trying to find overarching principles, perhaps taking the axiological approach of considering what things are intrinsically good.  But in all this, morality is only a small part of the complete picture.

I would attribute a number of philosophical problems to focusing on morality rather than practical reason.  The metaphysical nature of a moral judgement such as ‘stealing is morally wrong’ is quite mysterious.  This mysteriousness makes it credible to say that such moral judgements are purely emotive.[vii]  It also makes it credible to say that such judgements are systematically in error.[viii]  By contrast, most practical judgements can be seen as human assessments of how actions relate to ends and so are metaphysically unmysterious.[ix]  By taking practical reason instead of morality as the starting point, these philosophical confusions fall away, and as practical reason has an essential function, it cannot be dismissed as being emotive or an error.

A further advantage with practical reason is that it provides a neutral starting point acceptable to all.  From this perspective, other approaches can be seen as partial, prejudging what is important within practical reason and failing to comprehensively answer the full range of practical questions.  Deontological approaches see duties as central, but do not advise what should be done when duty is not in point.[x]  Virtue ethics highlight the importance of character, but this alone will often not determine what should be done.  Consequentialist approaches can be applied to practical reasoning at different levels, but can fail to appreciate how social norms constrain decision-making.[xi]

But most importantly, by starting from practical reason, philosophical confusions and a skewed perspective are removed, and we can directly address the fundamental job of making better practical choices at all levels.  Practical reasoning stands beside theoretical reasoning as an ongoing human endeavour. We may hope that over time our collective skills accumulate so we can improve on our evolved instincts and achieve both better factual knowledge and better normative understanding of how to act.[xii] Making good decisions has always been a human need, but it is now even more important as we have big issues that are distant from our evolutionary roots, greater interconnectedness and more power to do good or bad.[xiii]

We say we are doing ‘moral philosophy’ and the etymology of both ‘moral’ and ‘ethics’ reflects a narrow moral concept.  It therefore may be assumed that contemporary ethicists use a narrow concept.  But I doubt this is the case – I believe that in practice most thinkers without much fuss take a concept that is at least somewhat wider.  However, as I have set out, I think there are advantages in taking all practical reason as our starting point, and being explicit about this.

So, practical reason is the better starting point.  It covers the full range of practical questions.  It avoids the term ‘morality’ which is variable, changing and dubious.  It reflects a basic human function and is well-defined and uncontroversial.  It makes clear the full subject area of ethics and the landscape of issues.  It removes the metaphysical confusions and the doubts that have arisen from the focus on morality.  It provides a neutral starting point from which other approaches can be seen as prejudging and partial. Above all, it clears away confusions and allows a straightforward focus on the ever more important task of making better choices about what to do.

Notes

[i] I am here using ‘ethics’ to denote the broad field studied in philosophical ethics and not as a synonym for morality.

[ii] By ‘practical reason’ I mean the domain of all situation where a choice can be made about how to act and the task of making good choices across the domain

[iii] (Haidt 2012)

[iv] (Mackie 1977)

[v] (Haidt 2012)

[vi] (Finlay 2014)

[vii] (Blackburn 1998)

[viii] (Mackie 1977)

[ix] (Finlay 2014)

[x] In (Kant 1788), Kant’s subject was notionally practical reason, but he dismissed all aspects of practical reason apart from his conception of duty.   

[xi] (Sidgwick 1907), is another example of prejudgement with Sidgwick’s assumption that a method of ethics must be systematic  

[xii] See (Deutsch 2011) on the power of accumulating knowledge

[xiii] See (Ord 2020) on big issues

References

Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.

Deutsch, David. 2011. The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World.

Finlay, Stephen. 2014. Confusion of Tounges: A Theory of Normative Language.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion.

Kant, Immanuel. 1788. Critique of Practical Reason .

Mackie, John. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.

Ord, Toby. 2020. The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity.

Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. The Methods Of Ethics.

This essay was included in the 2020 OUDCE Philosophical Society Annual Review