My Writing

This is a list of my writings included on my blog, most recent posts first.  To date I have mainly written about metaethics and utilitarianism.

How Best to Subdivide Philosophical Ethics

Philosophical Ethics is commonly divided into three areas: Normative Ethics, Metaethics and Applied Ethics. I suggest adding a fourth area – Particular Decisions – and being explicit that each area covers practical reason generally rather than just morality.

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Susan Blackmore. Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (2017)

‘Delusionism is the best explanation for scientific discoveries and reflections about consciousness. My sense of being a conscious self is constructed when I probe by asking if I am conscious, while at other times my brain and experience reflect parallel processing. It is a delusion to think I have a unified conscious stream, a detailed visual field, a self or free will.’ My Notes on the Book

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Jonathan Haidt. The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science (2006)

‘Psychological findings provide a distinctive picture of human nature which can be compared with ancient wisdom and used to provide guidance on how to live. Conscious reasoning is like a rider on the elephant of the unconscious mind. Happiness can come from creating good relationships with love, work and something larger, but can only be achieved by training the elephant.’ My Notes on the Book

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Three Problems of Free Will

‘I find it helpful to see the issue of free will as involving not one problem but three’ A short essay arguing that two traditional problems of free will can be dismissed and the third is only true in part.

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Mackie’s Ethics: Right and Wrong

John Mackie’s 1977 book ‘Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong’ strongly influenced my views on ethics, mainly from my reactions against it. I analyse where I think Mackie got it wrong and how my current perspective incorporates ideas from the book. See a separate post for my notes recording the book’s contents.

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Why I Am A Naturalist

‘I am a naturalist. I believe that everything can be understood purely as relating to the natural world and that there is nothing supernatural.’ A short essay arguing for naturalism and exploring its significance.

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A Person Has No Soul

‘Am I the same person as my 10-year-old self? In the sense of having the same identifiable body: yes. In the sense of psychological continuity: partly. In the sense of having the same soul: no such thing.’ A short essay on bodily, psychological and essence concepts of personhood.

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How Both Human History and The History Of Ethics May be Just Beginning

My favourite philosophical passage is the final section of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. In a few paragraphs he introduces two profound ideas: the importance of humanity’s long-term future and that non-religious ethics has only just begun. I discuss the passage in historical context and add my thoughts on how ethics has been stunted by religion and non-cognitivism and how clarifying meta-ethics could clear the ground for normative ethics.

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Hume on the Role of Reason in Morality

Hume made influential bold claims about the limited role of reason in morality. I argue that a close reading shows that Hume is not consistent in his dismissals of reason. I also argue that Hume overlooks the fundamental normative function of ethics. This was a 2019 essay for my Birkbeck MA.

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Normative and Motivating Reasons to Be Good

I answer ‘Why Should I be Good’ by distinguishing normative and motivating reasons. I also touch on a number of my pet themes including end-relational normativity, welfare, happiness, expanding the moral circle, reason against instinct, effective altruism, the role of rules and different metaethical views, This is an edited scrip from a talk I gave to the Oxford University Department for Continuing Education on 4 September 2021 and is included in the 2021 OUDCE Philosophical Society Annual Review.

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Practical Reason First

I argue that the starting point for considering ethics should be practical reason broadly rather than morality. Practical reason covers the full range of practical questions and reflects a basic human function. It provides a neutral starting point and makes clear the full subject area of ethics and the landscape of issues. It removes the metaphysical bewilderment and the doubts that have arisen from the focus on morality. Above all, it clears away confusions and allows a straightforward focus on the ever more important task of making better choices about what to do.

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