Both Ethics and Ethical Concepts are Man-Made
An essay arguing that ethical concepts are man-made and can be improved.
How Best to Subdivide Philosophical Ethics
An essay arguing that philosophical ethics should include ‘Particular Decisions’ as a category and explicitly cover all of practical reason.
David Edmonds. Parfit.
My review and notes on a delightful biography of philosopher Derek Parfit.
Alastair Norcross. Morality By Degrees.
My notes on a book that argues that consequentalist ethical theories just judge the degree to which states of the world and actions are better than alternatives.
Mackie’s Ethics: Right and Wrong
An essay discussing John Mackie’s ‘Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,’ which strongly influenced my views on ethics, mainly from my reactions against it.
How Both Human History and The History Of Ethics May be Just Beginning
A discussion of my favourite philosophical passage, the final section of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. In a few paragraphs he introduces two profound ideas: the importance of humanity’s long-term future and that non-religious ethics has only just begun.
Do Value Judgements Have A Simple Nature?
A briefer statement of my view that normativity is end-relational and that appreciating this resolves the mysteries of practical reason.
If Morality Is An Illusion Does Anything Matter?
A paper for my Birkbeck MA arguing that even if morality is not objective, this does not matter, as morality is only a small element within practical reason.
End Relational Practical Reason and Morality – Full Paper
My Birkbeck MA Thesis arguing that an end-relational approach explains practical reason and morality.
Hume on Reason
An essay for my Birkbeck MA discussing David Hume’s claims about the limited role of reason in morality.
Normative and Motivating Reasons to Be Good
An edited script from a 2021 talk to The Philosophical Society: Oxford. I answer ‘Why Should I be Good’ by distinguishing normative and motivating reasons and set out my approach to ethics.
Practical Reason First
An essay arguing that the starting point for ethics should be practical reason broadly rather than morality.