Philosophy and Ideas
The end-relational theory of normative language (‘the Theory’) holds that all normative judgements relate to ends. Stephen Finlay presents the Theory as a powerful approach which gives a unified explanation of normativity, practical reason and morality.
In this essay I will develop and extend Finlay’s approach by first setting out how the Theory explains the nature of practical reason and then considering whether morality has the same nature.
Practical Reason and Metanormativity
I start with practical reason outside morality as it appears more straightforward than morality. Practical reason, choosing how to act, is extensive, as we always need to decide what to do, on matters large or small, as individuals or as groups. By contrast, although morality has been the main philosophical focus, it can be placed as a relatively minor element within the broad field of practical reason.
Practical reason is part of the normative, which covers evaluations and value judgments, how things ought to be and relations to standards. Normative claims can be contrasted with positive claims which cover descriptions, explanations, predictions and facts. Practical reason is the part of the normative that evaluates the practical.
A simple normative vocabulary is used throughout practical reason. For example, the word ‘good’ can be used for individual decisions such as ‘it would be good to have a coffee’, for government decisions ‘it would be good to reduce taxes’ and for morality ‘it is good to give to charity.’ The word is also used widely for normative assessments outside practical reason, such as in ‘the weather is good.’
The normative vocabulary includes ubiquitous words such as ‘good’, ‘ought’ and ‘right’, which are related to each other and convey a suite of ‘thin’ general purpose normative concepts that we readily apply across numerous contexts. We also have words that are ‘thick’ in that they combine normative and factual elements, for example ‘quick’, ‘kind’ and ‘brave.’
End-Relational Theory
What is the central meaning of the widely-used normative words? According to the Theory, they all concern evaluating an object, state or action relative to an end, standard or other criterion. The Theory claims we use the words fluently as we instinctively apply an underlying end-relational semantics but that this is often obscured as we communicate pragmatically and do not state explicitly ends that are clear from context. For example, I say ‘I ought to go home now’ but this is relative to an end omitted by ellipsis: ‘so I can get to bed.’ The Theory suggests that the underlying semantic of the normative words is always to evaluate an ‘object’ (broadly construed to include actions and states of affairs) relative to ‘ends’ (broadly construed to include standards and other criteria).
To illustrate: my end is to clean a very dirty pan which I know would make a mess in the dishwasher. I naturally employ the normative vocabulary – I ‘ought’ or ‘should’ or ‘must’ wash it by hand, washing up would be ‘good’ or ‘better’ or ‘right’; I ‘ought not’ or ‘must not’ use the dishwasher, to do so would be ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. My normative judgement that washing up is better is a straightforward answer to a question about the relation between an ‘object’ (using the dishwasher) and an ‘end’ (cleaning the pan) which, having seen a bad pan mess up a dishwasher, has a clear factual answer.
The picture of practical reason is of action being guided by evaluations of actions and objects relative to ‘ends.’ Trivially, any evaluation could be made – ‘Are bananas good for high tides?’ answer: ‘neither good nor bad’ – but we concentrate on evaluating relevant ends and means. Choosing ‘ends’ is an essential part of practical reasoning, although ‘ends’ are left vague and fluid when it is not efficient to specify them precisely.
Analysing Normative Words
As analysed by Finlay, under the end-relational theory ‘good’ is a binary predicate with two terms, an ‘object’ p and an ‘end’ e. ‘Good’ has the logical form Good(p,e) and concerns the relationship between p and e, approximately that p promotes e.
Finlay thinks we can go further and define ‘good’ as meaning that p increases the probability of e, so:
It’s good for e if p given b means that pr(e\p & b) > pr(e\~p & b)
p is good for e for given background b if the probability of e occurring with p is greater than the probability without p. Or ‘cleaning a bad pan is normally more likely by hand.’ Similarly, the normative modal verb ‘ought’ is analysed as meaning the most probable means to an end.
There is an interesting result here, that a naturalistic analytic reduction of normative words in terms of probabilities appears possible.
Strengths of the End-Relational Theory
Returning to the dishwasher example, my normative judgement to wash by hand is about the relation between an aspect of the world and an end. This is similar to a factual judgement such as ‘there is a dishwasher in the kitchen’ which relates something in the world to human concepts. Another example of the closeness of positive and normative judgements is the similarity between a prediction that the sun will rise at 6am tomorrow and a judgement to travel after 6am to drive in daylight.
These examples show that the Theory is powerful not only because it provides a unified explanation for normative words but also because it presents normative statements as having a similar nature to factual statements. Both factual and normative statements consider objective features of the world using human concepts. A factual statement such as ‘there are two cakes on the table’ uses our concepts to report on aspects of the world. A normative statement like ‘eating both cakes would not be good for the health of a diabetic’ uses our concepts to evaluate how ‘objects’ in the world relate to ‘ends.’ As factual judgements vary from the certain to the unknowable, so normative evaluations range from the obviously true ‘I must drink to stay alive’ to the unknowable ‘I don’t know whether this job will be good for my long-term happiness.’
Under the Theory, the metaphysics of normative language is therefore simple and uninteresting. A normative judgement is just a recognition of a relationship between an ‘object’ and an ‘end’. It is no more interesting than a recognition of a fact in the world. A value judgement is not a ‘thing’ that exists in the world beyond the judgement itself, it has no more of an ontology than does the recognition of a fact. This can be considered a kind of realist view in that normative judgements are considered as real as factual judgments. Although both involve human assessment, they both are tied to the world.
Importantly, the end-relational theory seems to cover the key features we see in normative language and thinking:
It is impressive that the Theory can comfortably explain all these features of normativity and practical reason, unlike rival approaches.
A Further Justification
Finlay justifies the end-relational theory mainly from our fluent use of normative words across the normative domain. But I consider the Theory can be further supported by another argument, that it always appears possible to question evaluations by asking ‘for what end?’ Although we may initially think of an evaluation as unrelativized, asking the question always seems to tease out relationships to ‘ends’. An evaluation that under questioning stood in isolation unrelated to any criterion would be a strange animal. It appears a deep requirement that normative judgements be relativized.
Morality and Metamorals
The Theory may be a promising explanation of normativity and practical reason (metanormativity), but does morality share this nature (metamorals)? To consider how morality can be distinguished within practical reason I note five major features.
The first is that morality is about overriding one’s own immediate interests for others or for principles. That morality trumps personal interests can make it seem precious and other-worldly and may contribute to seeing morality as more than just an aspect of the natural world.
The second feature is that morality concerns a range of central rules. Most societies have in some form a suite of basic rules and restrictions which mainly relate to human welfare, which from evolution come naturally to us and which are widely accepted. Compliance with such ‘core morality’ is supported by ‘reactive attitudes’ – failure to comply leads to attitudes such as blame, resentment and punishment. Core morality constrains damaging behaviour, reduces fears of violations, promotes a degree of altruism, supports agreements and property rights, upholds family obligations, and provides coordination.
But morality is sometimes more than core morality. The third feature, ‘aspirational morality’, is morality’s wider concerns including altruism beyond the minimum required by core morality, concern for non-human animals, religious considerations and personal principles. While core morality is near-compulsory, aspirational morality includes other principles that are important to individuals, but less supported by the reactive attitudes. Aspirational morality can include thinking beyond one’s self and immediate circle towards a view ‘all things considered.’
While the first three features concern the function and content of morality, the fourth feature concerns some distinctly objective and absolute concepts and language which are often used in morality. Four related points can be distinguished. First, sometimes we speak of moral behaviour as being required absolutely: we say ‘do not steal’ as a categorical imperative rather than say ‘do not steal to avoid suffering’ as a hypothetical imperative. Second, morality often has a law-like character. Third, some objectified language suggests that morality is about independently-existing objective facts as when two sides in a moral debate will claim that they are each ‘right’, as if there is an objective fact to be found. And fourth, sometimes morality is thought of as being mind-independent, having some kind of independent existence.
The final feature is morality’s relation to religion. Historically and currently, many see morality as commanded by God, and perhaps supported by rewards and punishment in an afterlife. For many believers, morality will be different from the rest of practical reason as commanded by God.
How widespread are each of the five features? Overriding one’s immediate interest at times seems to be an almost universal human feature, as does the presence of central rules and a degree of wider concerns. By contrast, categorical imperatives, a law-like character, objectified language, mind-independence and religion vary between cultures and individuals.
Applying the End-Relational Theory to Morality
Can the five features be accommodated by the end-relational theory? Looking at the first three together, in respect of its action-affecting content, morality is like other practical thinking but with a particular focus on overriding self, considering others, following principles and complying with rules. All of these elements can be dealt with under the end-relational approach by inclusion among the ends to be pursued. Also, these elements are not unique to morality – for example we need to consider others in our families, and we need to comply with rules in our jobs. As far as morality’s actual action-related content is concerned, there seems to be considerable continuity between morality and practical reason generally. Deliberation about morality can be conducted in the same end-relational terms using the common normative vocabulary.
But while morality’s content can be dealt with in end-relational terms, its objectified language is more challenging. Most writers have seen morality’s objectified and categorical language as the distinct mark of the moral and something which definitely cannot be assimilated to an end-relational model. Finlay disagrees and argues that categorical imperatives, law-like character and objectified language can be explained as being pragmatic and that the underlying semantics of our moral speech is always end-relational. He explains categorical statements as reflecting ends omitted by ellipsis and explains the motivating force of moral language as arising pragmatically by implication from the context. He argues that objectified moral language is not a fundamental feature and that our use of objectified language does not commit us to regarding morality as mind-independent. Finlay cannot accommodate mind-independent or divine command moral conceptions, but from a naturalistic viewpoint these can be dismissed as erroneous.
Moral Objectification as Optional
I see three reasons to expect morality to have a similar nature to other parts of practical reason. Their underlying subject matter is the same – both are ultimately concerned with how to act. They both share the same normative language. And there is continuity between morality and practical reason with no agreed way to draw a boundary.
We can choose not to treat morality as objective or divine command as we have other reasons to act morally – moral reasons are overdetermined. Consider the possible motivations to act morally, say where I could take cash from someone’s wallet without being found out. I may act morally from:
The first six considerations remain even if we stop thinking of morality in objectified or religious terms.
Civil behaviour is similar to core morality in being an evolved feature supported by reactive attitudes. But norms of civility operate without invoking objective rules or religious commands and we can and do deal with morality in the same way.
Morality changes over time. The Greeks did not have our idea of morality, and current conceptions have roots in particular religious and philosophical ideas. It may be that our moral concepts are in the process of evolving so that they become more thoroughly secular and make morality less distinct from the rest of practical reason. If practical reason has an end-relational nature, then a modern morality can too.
Reference
Finlay, S (2014). Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. OUP. See especially Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 9.