Philosophy and Ideas
If Morality is an Illusion, Does Anything Matter?
1. Introduction
There can be various motivations for the thought that morality is an illusion and perhaps therefore that nothing matters. Here, I will concentrate on the challenge from moral error theory which regards morality as in error because it lacks the objective character that we seem to assume it has.
I will start by outlining the moral error theory as presented by Mackie[1] and its view that our moral concepts assume an objectivity which they do not have. I will then present three arguments to show that any erroneous objectivity is not fundamental to our moral concepts so that morality is not an illusion. I will then examine the place of morality within practical reasoning and will argue that as moral error theory only affects core morality within practical reasoning, there is no effect on what matters. Finally, I will consider how we should react to the degree of false objectivity that our moral thinking may have and suggest that we should be able to adjust any problematic moral concepts.
2. Moral Error Theory
Moral error theory starts from contrasting the conceptual claim that our moral language and concepts have a fundamentally objective character with the ontological claim that objective moral facts do not exist. The view can be said to be realist about our moral language but anti-realist about morality’s metaphysics: “Kantians are right about the objective aspirations of moral thought but the Humeans are right about the underlying reality.”[2] Mackie described his view as “an error theory, admitting that a belief in objective values is built into our ordinary moral thought and language, but holding that this ingrained belief is false.”[3] Mackie considers that an assumption of absolute, categorical moral authority “is incorporated in the basic, conventional, meanings of moral terms.”[4] But he argues that objective values with in-built prescriptive force “would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe,”[5] both ontologically and epistemologically queer. Further, he argues that the relativity of moral codes is better explained as arising from different ways of life than as imperfect perceptions of objective moral values.
Mackie regards his error theory as applying only to the “second order” question of the status of our moral concepts but not applying to our “first order” moral judgements. The statement “Murder is Wrong” is considered false because there is no such thing as an objective “Wrong” rather than because “Murder is Wrong” is judged false within our moral thinking.[6]
Importantly, Mackie sees the error theory as only applying to value judgements that are categorical rather than hypothetical. Although Mackie opens with the bald statement that “There are no objective values”[7] he later clarifies that hypothetical judgments that are relative to an end are not problematic, writing “there are certain kinds of value statements which can undoubtedly be true or false, even if in the sense I intend there are no objective values. Evaluations of many sorts are commonly made in relation to agreed and assumed standards.”[8] So, moral judgments that seem to be made categorically are the issue, while the error theory does not apply to the broader subject of practical reason.[9]
On an initial pass, does Mackie’s view imply, first, that morality is an illusion and, second, that nothing matters? The answer to the first question seems unclear due to his view that even systematic error in our moral concepts would not affect our first-order moral judgements. The answer to the second question seems clearer – as it is only the distinctly moral within the wider realm of practical reasoning that is claimed to be in error, then other forms of normative thinking should not be affected and will remain of value.
In the next two sections I will look at these two questions further, examining whether the error theory shows that morality is illusory and then considering the place of morality within practical reasoning.
3. Why the Error Is Not Fundamental to Morality
While Mackie uses a moral error framework to argue that the objectivity of values is fundamental to our moral concepts but is untrue, the same approach could be used to argue that other aspects of our moral concepts are incorrect, and that the error in question is either fundamental – so as to be constitutive of our moral concepts so the concepts themselves are in error – or less than fundamental, so just aspects of our concepts are wrong.[10] For example, we may consider that our moral concepts are law-like but that this is an error as there is no law-giver. Or, we may think that our moral concepts presume a god, so there is an error if we are non-religious. Or, think that we have binary concepts of “right” and “wrong”, which is in error as right action is generally a matter of degree. Or, consider that our concepts assume that moral thought converges on the truth, which is an error as much moral thinking does not converge.[11] And if errors such as these are established, we may consider that they either run so deep that they undermine morality, or are more modest and can be accommodated.
Mackie’s position is that objectivity is fundamental to our moral concepts, so that denying the truth of objectivity destroys the concepts. I disagree and will set out three arguments why objective values is a less than fundamental part of our moral concepts.
The first argument concerns the function of morality. Morality should be seen in context as a small part of the broader territory of practical reason. Practical reason is about evaluating how to act, and morality is a part of this which (broadly) uses rules to constrain selfish behaviour. Seen this way, moral thinking is fundamentally about deciding how to act, and any objectification is only a secondary feature. So, even if our moral concepts are erroneously objective, our moral thinking still stands as reaching conclusions about what to do. There is a parallel here with our thinking about motion where we may instinctively think of motion as being absolute even if in reality it is relative.[12] As we can effectively judge motion despite falsely assuming motion is absolute, so we can judge what to do within morality even if our moral concepts are mistakenly objective.
It is telling that despite his error theory, Mackie does not stop considering how we should act. He just recharacterizes moral practice as deciding what to do, including inventing rules, rather than finding moral facts.
My second argument concerns moral language. Consider this sample moral statement:
(1) It is good to be faithful in a marriage.
This seems to read as an objective claim, something considered true independently of us. The statement also seems to express that the speaker supports and will be motivated to be faithful in marriage and encourages the hearer similarly.
Now compare:
(2) If it is good to be faithful in a marriage, then polygamy is bad.
When the underlined phrase is embedded it seems less like an objective claim and the endorsement by the speaker and the motivational element are no longer there.
What is going on here? It seems that in reading sentence (1) we are making a pragmatic assumption about context, that the speaker is endorsing and is motivated by the view that one should be faithful in marriage and that he considers this objectively true. This further information could be explicitly added in by rewriting (1) as:
(3) I consider that it is objectively true that it is good to be faithful in a marriage
When the phrase is embedded in (2) these pragmatic elements disappear, and we are left with just the underlying semantics of the phrase. This suggests that a motivational element mainly occurs with certain first-person moral statements, due to pragmatic assumptions we make about such statements.
A distinctive feature of statement (1) is that it is categorical rather than hypothetical in that it does not say for what purpose or by what standard faithfulness is judged good. Categorical statements are sometimes seen as a defining feature of the moral.
But it seems unlikely that a word like “good” would have a different semantic structure in morality than elsewhere. Finlay[13] suggests that across its uses, “good” is always end-relational and refers to increasing the probability of an end. On his view a seemingly free-form categorical statement in morality has an unstated end in the background that can be understood from the context and is omitted by ellipsis. On this view, the end behind categorical moral statements may be to act in accordance with objective morality so that (1) should be expanded to:
(4) It is good, for objective morality, to be faithful in a marriage.
But is it clear that this is what the speaker has in mind? Perhaps he could be thinking:
(5) It is good, all things considered, to be faithful in a marriage
Or more likely the end is just left vague as it does not need to be fully addressed by the speaker, so he just means:
(6) It is good for people generally to be faithful in a marriage
So, although we make categorical moral statements, these may be explained as resulting from ellipsis, so that rather than such statements being about objectively-conceived morality, they may instead be making judgements relative to vaguely-defined ends.
My third argument against objectivity being fundamental to morality considers what happens in practice when someone recognises that their moral concepts are not in order as a result of moving into or out of religion. A religious conception of morality may typically see morality as commanded by god, backed by sanctions in an afterlife, strongly rule-based in character and covering worship obligations, dietary requirements and sanctity of life constraints in addition to rules relating to human welfare. By contrast, a secular morality will not be supported by divine command or divine sanctions, be more consequentalist and deal almost exclusively with sentient welfare. Moves between these two very different frameworks shows how people react when finding a deep error in their conception of morality and can highlight what is truly fundamental to morality. That the religious and non-religious can take similar views on matters of welfare suggests that for both, morality is fundamentally about choosing how to act concerning human interests. Despite different views of how morality is justified, for both the religious and non-religious the fundamental work of morality is to decide how to act.
So, considerations from the function of morality, from moral language and from transitions between moralities suggest that objectivity is not the fundamental, constitutive feature of morality that Mackie assumed. But I think a more modest thesis survives from Mackie – that some of our moral thinking can have a degree of objectivity that is unjustified. As Mackie suggests, western secular morality retains absolutist elements from its transition from an earlier religious approach, such as its law-like nature and a moral language suggesting absolutes. Assumptions that moral thinking converges to truth also seem problematic. Morality overall is not an illusion, but some ways of thinking within it are.
4. Morality in its Place
But how significant is morality as part of “what matters”? What matters relates to what is worth acting for, which is the subject of practical reasoning. Let us define practical reason as the broad area of evaluating how to act. Individuals, families, groups, businesses, governments and other agents have decisions to make about how they will influence the world, on matters from the mundane to the profound, and, when not lead by habit, instinct or whim, may to a degree make their choices by assessing reasons and evaluating alternatives. The direction of fit is to change the world rather than to read facts from the world. Choices can be made relative to various ends such as immediate self-interest, prudential self interest, self interest subject to moral constraints or the general good. While, practical reason ultimately relates to choices of actions, it also extends to cover principles, rules, character and institutions relevant to the process of choice.
Where does morality stand within the large field of practical reasoning? Here it is useful to distinguish two elements in morality which I term “core morality”[14] and “aspirational morality.” By core morality I mean a range of central rules and restrictions that generally relate to human welfare, which from evolution come naturally to us, which are widely accepted and compliance with which is supported by the reactive attitudes. Core morality is essential to the functioning of society by constraining damaging behaviour, removing fear, promoting a degree of altruism, supporting agreements and property rights, upholding family obligations, providing coordination and generally overcoming prisoners’ dilemmas. Core morality is often rule-based (although some questioning of the rules is permitted) and discussions can be in terms of morality as something absolute. Core morality can be seen as reflecting principles reasonably acceptable to all, so in the example above, both the religious and the secular can share a common core morality.
By contrast, aspirational morality covers the principles that agents treat as important, but which are not part of core morality and not subject to the reactive attitudes. This includes altruism beyond the minimum required by core morality, concern for non-human animals, religious considerations and personal principles. While core morality concerns basic behaviours needed to make society function, aspirational morality is about considering what should be done, often from a global consequentialist perspective and uses a less objectified language.
If we think there is an issue with unduly objective moral concepts, it would appear that this mainly affects core morality. But what matters for people is not core morality (which is generally taken as obvious social hygiene) but personal objectives and aspirational morality. To the extent that what matters to me is either my personal life or the moral aspirational aims I set for myself, these will not be affected by concern over whether the concepts used in core morality are falsely objective. Moral error theory does not seem to be a challenge to what matters.
5. Responding to Error
How should we react if we accept that our moral concepts have some false objectivity? Three approaches can be distinguished: Moral Abolitionism[15] – dropping the erroneous practices; Moral Conservationism[16]– retaining the practices; and Moral Fictionalism[17] – retaining the practices but treating them explicitly as fictional. For convenience I will use these terms although they sound overdramatic when applied to my view that the element of error in our moral concepts is limited and manageable – I disagree with (Joyce 2019) that “moral discourse is hopelessly broken,” so there will only be elements where issues arise.
That said, two potentially erroneous aspects can be distinguished – moralistic language and moralistic rules. On language, I generally agree with the Abolitionists that we can and should reduce our use of falsely-objective moral concepts and language. The main advantage is to allow choices in the moral domain to be made more clearly, honestly and flexibly without confusing absolutist requirements. Further advantages are avoiding the conflicts that can arise from moralistic intransigence and avoiding morality being used to oppress.[18] Moralistic language has some merits including simplicity, teachability and rhetorical power but we should have the linguistic resources to move beyond it – just as swearing isn’t needed to make a point.
Abolitionism is generally a natural way to proceed as we have available other non-moralistic ways of addressing the moral domain. This can be shown by reflecting on the various ways in which I may decide to act morally. Say I have the opportunity of taking £1,000 from someone’s wallet without being found out. There are a number of reasons why I may act morally and refrain, including:
The above list suggests that our reasons for acting morally are overdetermined and that we should be able to think in other ways if we drop “objective morality.” Indeed, this seems less radical than dropping “divine command” with its potentially powerful divine retribution sanction. That moral practice can survive the loss of religious faith shows that that there are other reasons for acting morally and suggests that it is not so difficult to stop thinking of morality as objectively required.
The Abolitionist approach to the erroneous elements in our moral concepts is possible as our moral concepts have changed over historic time and continue to evolve. The Greeks did not have our concept of the moral[19] and our current concepts owe much to “the great religions and enlightenment philosophy”[20]and may be in a process of transition to becoming more thoroughly secular. Our general normative vocabulary with words such as “good” and “right” provides a sound resource for non-moralistic thinking and debate.[21] We have flexibility about the style we use for moral issues – we can choose to be highly moralistic and make heavy uses of words like “duty” and “obligation” or at the other extreme we can avoid using the word “moral” altogether to avoid unwanted religious and absolutist overtones. We can choose not to see morality as law-like obligations. We can choose to avoid binary concepts of right/good and wrong/evil. We can choose not to assume that our thinking will converge on moral truth. We can avoid being too emphatic in our use of moral words and avoid words like “sin” and “evil” which no longer reflect our world view. This all seems achievable and may reflect the direction in which secular moral thinking is already moving.
But an important aspect of core morality is respect for rules. A rule such as “do not steal” is treated as firmly demanding, and it is clearly advantageous for the general good in terms of coordination, certainty and commitments that this be so. Therefore, our response to finding that the rules are not objectively true should not be Abolitionist, but should instead look to ensure the rules are retained. One approach to this is the Conservationist recommendation that even if when reflecting we appreciate there are no objective rules, in our practice we should continue to believe in the rules as objectively true. But more honest and sustainable is to take the Fictionalist route and instead recognise the rules as a useful fiction.
Humans are very good at working with fictions, as seen in our use of stories, metaphor, mathematics and scientific modelling. In the field of practical reasoning we have acceptance of law, political institutions and human rights, all of which are man-made but treated as obligatory. In a similar way, we can abide by the rules of core morality even if we do not regard them as objective requirements. If we need a normative justification, we can use the constructivist reasoning from above: “I follow the moral rules because I recognise to do so is advantageous overall.” Such background thinking is close to the surface – we can see that society needs some basic rules and as decent citizens we accept that we should generally follow them.
My proposal then is Abolitionism for our moral language and concepts and Fictionalism for our moral rules. These both take an honest approach to our understanding of morality and so should allow clearer reasoning about how to act. Although this involves softening our over-objective moral language, it should not weaken our commitment to morality. Far from seeing morality as illusory, we can become stronger supporters of morality by being clearer about what core morality is and its benefits.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have considered whether the moral error theory leads to the view that morality is an illusion and whether as a result nothing matters This paper has argued that while some of our moral concepts are to a degree erroneously objective, perhaps partly as a hangover from a divine command view, as this objectivity is not fundamental, our moral thinking is not illusory. It was further argued that it is only “core morality” within the wide field of practical reasoning that has objective moral concepts, so that “what matters” is not affected by the challenge from the moral error theory. Finally, I considered how we should respond to morality’s overstated objectivity and suggested that we should be able to revise some of our concepts while retaining our commitment to core morality.
Notes
[1] (Mackie 1977)
[2] (Lillehammer 2011)
[3] (Mackie 1977, 48-49)
[4] (Mackie 1977, 35)
[5] (Mackie 1977, 38)
[6] (Olson 2011)
[7] (Mackie 1977, 15)
[8] (Mackie 1977, 25-26)
[9] (Phillips 2007)
[10] (Fisher 2011)
[11] (Lillehammer 2004)
[12] (Finlay 2008)
[13] (Finlay 2014) and (Finlay 2001)
[14] (Williams 1985), (Scanlon 1998) and (Darwall 2018) have related concepts
[15] (Garner 2007) and (Garner 2019)
[16] (Olson 2011) and (Erriksson and Olson 2019)
[17] (Joyce 2005) and (Joyce 2019)
[18] (Isserow 2019) argues that as absolutist morality is commonly associated with absolutist religion or nationalism, the historic evidence against absolutist morality alone is unclear
[19] (MacIntyre 1984)
[20] (Lillehammer 2011)
[21] (Blackford 2019)
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