James Aitchison
Philosophy and Ideas
This page brings together my views on practical reason, its nature, and its importance.
Practical reason is the activity of judging how to act. It answers the question ‘What should we do?’
It is helpful to contrast this with theoretical reason. Theoretical reason concerns what is the case; practical reason concerns what to do. The former is factual, the latter normative.
Understanding practical reason matters because it is a central human function, underpinning all decision-making from everyday choices to public policy.
On my view, practical reason consists in human judgements about how to achieve ends. It is not grounded in external moral facts, natural laws, or divine commands. There is no independent realm of ‘oughts’ to be discovered.
Yet such judgements are not arbitrary. They are answerable to the world. A judgement about what to do can be true or false depending on how actions relate to ends and how those ends stand up to scrutiny. We assess these judgements by considering evidence, consequences, and their coherence with other judgements.
Ends themselves are not beyond reason. Some ends are better than others, and we can reflect on them, revise them, and compare them.
This yields a simple picture: practical reason is a matter of forming and assessing judgements about ends and the means to achieve them, in light of how the world is.
As shown by Stephen Finlay, practical judgements have an end-relational structure. Normative terms such as ‘good’ and ‘ought’ are not fixed but work relative to ends.
To say that an action is good, or that one ought to do it, is to say that it stands in the right relation to relevant ends—that it is an effective means of achieving them.
This applies both to means and to ends themselves. We can ask whether an action achieves a given end, and whether that end is worth pursuing.
On this view, practical reasoning is unified and relatively simple. It involves evaluating how actions relate to ends, and how those ends compare.
I have found it very helpful to start with practical reason rather than with morality.
Practical reason is a broad domain, covering all forms of decision-making. Morality is only a part of it, and a contested part that often carries supernatural overtones. If we begin with morality, it is tempting to see ethics as mysterious or insubstantial.
If we instead begin with practical reasoning more generally, the picture becomes clearer. Moral judgements are continuous with other practical judgements: they are attempts to work out what to do, given our ends and the facts of the world.
This is a grounded view of practical reason. It avoids two opposing errors.
On one side are unworldly views, which treat values and obligations as having an independent existence. These views cannot explain how such facts fit into a naturalistic understanding of the world.
On the other side are non-cognitivist views, which treat moral judgements as expressions of attitude or taste. These views struggle to account for the apparent objectivity and importance of ethical disagreement.
The grounded view retains what is compelling in both: it recognises that practical judgements are human, but also that they can be assessed as better or worse by reference to the world and to the ends we have reason to endorse.
This view answers the central questions of metaethics. On this account, practical reason and morality have a simple metaphysical nature: they are human judgements. They also have a simple epistemology: we arrive at them by looking at how facts in the world bear on our ends.
This contrasts with religious views, which base morality on divine commands, and with much twentieth-century moral philosophy, which was often non-cognitivist, treating moral judgements not as true or false claims but as expressions of attitudes or preferences.
Why did moral philosophy take this path? One reason, I think, is that it focused narrowly on analysing morality in isolation. When morality is seen instead as part of practical reason—as continuous with ordinary reasoning about what to do—its structure and status become much clearer.
Several things follow from this account.
Practical and moral reasoning are continuous with ordinary reasoning about what to do. They share the same end-relational structure: we assess how actions relate to ends.
Practical and moral judgements are truth-apt—some are better than others. At the same time, the world is complex and our knowledge is limited, so disagreement is to be expected. Making the ends and means in our thinking more explicit can improve our judgements.
Most importantly, we can use reason directly in guiding action, without being distracted by the thought that practical reason is either unworldly or merely expressive.
Is Morality Real? In this essay I argue that morality is real as involving grounded, truth apt judgements.
Practical Reason First. An essay proposing that we start from practical reason rather than morality to better understand ethics.
Both Ethics and Ethical Concepts Are Man Made In this essay I argue that our ethical concepts are man made and can be improved
The End-Relational Nature of Practical Reason and Morality Full Paper My MA Dissertation developing the view that practical reason and morality are end-relational.
The End-Relational Nature of Practical Reason and Morality Abridged Paper A shorter version of my dissertation.
Do Value Judgements Have A Simple Nature? An essay arguing that value judgments are best understood as end-relational.
Normative and Motivating Reasons to Be Good. Script from a presentation distinguishing normative and motivating reasons.
How Best to Subdivide Philosophical Ethics An essay suggesting that philosophical ethics should not be restricted to morality.
Mackie’s Ethics: Right and Wrong A discussion of how my reaction to John Mackie’s book lead to my metaethical views.
Yes, We Can Reason About Ends An essay arguing that we can and do reason about ends.
Bullet Points on Metaethics, Utilitarianism and Effective Altruism. A brief summary of my views.
Stephen Finlay. Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language (2014) Argues that normative language is end-relational, the subject of my MA dissertation.
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer. The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. (2014) Includes discussions of metaethics from a perspective close to mine.
Jonathan Haidt. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. (2012). An evolutionary psychology explanation of morality in its varieties.
J.L Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) Argues that morality is not objective and that therefore morality is an error.
Sam Harris. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. (2010) Argues that morality needs to be grounded rather than objectivist or emotivist.
Page updated 17 April 2026